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Carlos Murguia and Paulo Tabuada
Abstract—For a class of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs), we
address the problem of performing computations over the cloud
without revealing private information about the structure and
operation of the system. We model CPSs as a collection of
input-output dynamical systems (the system operation modes).
Depending on the mode the system is operating on, the output
trajectory is generated by one of these systems in response
to driving inputs. Output measurements and driving inputs
are sent to the cloud for processing purposes. We capture
this “processing” through some function (of the input-output
trajectory) that we require the cloud to compute accurately
– referred here as the trajectory utility. However, for privacy
reasons, we would like to keep the mode private, i.e., we do
not want the cloud to correctly identify what mode of the CPS
produced a given trajectory. To this end, we distort trajectories
before transmission and send the corrupted data to the cloud.
We provide mathematical tools (based on output-regulation
techniques) to properly design distorting mechanisms so that:
1) the original and distorted trajectories lead to the same utility;
and the distorted data leads the cloud to misclassify the mode.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a hyperconnected world, scientific and technological
advances have led to an overwhelming amount of user data
being collected and processed by hundreds of companies
over the cloud. Companies mine and classify this data to
provide personalized services and advertising. However,
these new technologies have also led to an alarming
widespread loss of privacy in society. Depending on the
adversariesâA˘Z´ resources, they may infer critical (private)
information about the operation of systems from public
data available on the internet and unsecured/public servers
and communication networks. A motivating example of this
privacy loss is the data collection, classification, and sharing
by the Internet-of-Things (IoT) [1], which is, most of the
time, done without the userâA˘Z´s informed consent. Another
example of privacy loss is the potential use of data from
smart electrical meters by criminals, advertising agencies,
and governments, for monitoring the presence and activities
of occupants, [2]-[3]. These privacy concerns show that
there is an acute need for privacy preserving mechanisms
capable of handling the new privacy challenges induced
by a hyperconnected world. That is why researchers from
different fields (e.g., computer science, information theory,
and control theory) have been attracted to the broad research
area of privacy and security of Cyber-Physical Systems
(CPSs), see, e.g., [4]-[28].
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In this manuscript, for a class of Cyber-Physical Systems
(CPSs), we address the problem of performing computations
over the cloud without revealing private information about
the structure and operation of the system. That is, the
objective is to have the cloud provide a service by processing
system data while preventing it from learning private infor-
mation. The setting that we consider is the following. The
underlying physical part of the system (the system dynamics)
consists of a finite collection of N input-output dynamical
systems, Σi, i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Depending on the mode the
system is operating on, sensor measurements are generated
by one of these dynamical systems in response to driving
inputs. Each subsystem characterizes an operation mode of
the CPS. For instance, the operation of fitness trackers is
based on different modes (i.e., different dynamical systems)
indicating our activity level, e.g., depending whether we
are walking, running, or resting, sensors/actuators embed-
ded in the device would provide different data and this
data would be consistent with the corresponding dynamical
system. That is, we have a dynamical system explaining
the data for walking, one for running, and one for resting.
Under normal operating conditions, sensor measurements
and driving inputs are sent to the cloud for monitoring or
processing purposes. However, for privacy reasons, we would
like to keep the mode private. To accomplish this, we use
knowledge of the system dynamics to appropriately modify
sensor measurements and driving inputs generated by/for
system Σi so that the distorted data appears to have been
generated by a different target system, Σj , j 6= i, within
the operation modes of the CPS, and we send the distorted
data to the cloud. The idea is that if the target system is
sufficiently different (in some appropriate sense) from the
mode that generated the data, the cloud would incorrectly
classify the mode.
Note, however, that we do not want to overly distort the
data. The main reason for sharing system data is to have the
cloud provide a service by processing it. Usually, there is
some function of the sensor data that we would like the cloud
to compute accurately–referred here as the utility function.
For instance, in intelligent transportation systems, we might
want the cloud to accurately compute the current highway
capacity (the road congestion level) or the shortest route to
a destination using, e.g., the average speed of our vehicle
(and all other vehicles in the highway). The utility function
imposes a constraint on the class of systems that we can use
as target systems. Concretely, we aim at modifying input-
output data so that: (1) the utility function evaluated at the
distorted data equals its value on the original data; and (2) the
output trajectory seems to have been generated by the target
system in response to driving inputs, i.e., the provided input-
output data is consistent with the target system dynamics. We
remark that we do not make any assumption on the classi-
fication algorithm employed by the cloud. It is unrealistic
to assume we know how data is being classified. Hundreds
of companies and governmental agencies collect, mine, and
classify data from the cloud using advanced machine learning
algorithms and data from thousands of users. However, if one
is only concerned about misclassifying specific modes of the
system dynamics, arguably, mapping output trajectories and
driving inputs to a different mode would lead to incorrect
classification if the model of the modes that we use to design
the distorting mechanism is accurate enough to capture the
true dynamic behavior of the system.
Most of the work related to privacy of dynamical sys-
tems deals with keeping the system state private (in some
appropriate sense) when output measurements and the system
model are disclosed for processing purposes, see, e.g., [21]-
[27]. All these manuscripts follow stochastic formulations
where the objective is twofold: 1) To quantify the potential
information leakage given a privacy metric (e.g., based on
differential privacy [29] or information-theoretic [30]); and
2) To design randomizing mechanisms to distort data so
that the distorted disclosed data provides prescribed privacy
guarantees. In this manuscript, we address a fundamentally
different problem. First, we consider fully deterministic
systems and thus stochastic privacy metrics do not make
sense in our setting. Secondly, we are not concerned with
privacy of the system state per se, but it is the mode
the system is operating on what we want to keep private.
Because we consider LTI dynamics for each mode, all the
input-output data that a mode can generate forms a linear
subspace (referred here as the mode behaviour). So, instead
of looking for the probability distribution of the noise to
inject (as it is usually done in stochastic formulations), we
seek distorting mechanisms, based on system-theoretic tools
(output regulation), that maps data from the actual mode
behaviour into the behaviour of a different target mode, while
maintaining its utility invariant.
There are results dealing with privacy of deterministic
dynamical systems in the literature – mostly using encryp-
tion/coding techniques [28],[31]-[37]. These techniques rely
on two objects: the encryption scheme itself; and an algo-
rithm that can be used to perform the required computations
over the encrypted data. Both, the encrypted data and the
algorithm, are shared with the cloud but not the decryption
key. The cloud then performs computations without having to
decrypt, returns the encrypted result, and the user extracts the
result using the decryption key. Results in this manuscript are
aligned with these ideas. The difference is that our tools do
not rely in computationally expensive encryption techniques
– the proposed scheme is linear and easy to implement.
Moreover, our scheme does not need to provide an algorithm
to perform computations over the distorted data. The idea
is that both the original and distorted data return the same
utility. Meaning that the service we require the cloud to
provide is invariant under the proposed distorting scheme.
To the best of the authors knowledge, the problem addressed
here has not been considered before as it is posed here.
Notation: The notation col(x1, . . . , xn) stands for the
column vector composed of the elements x1, . . . , xn. This
notation is also used in case the components xi are vectors.
The n × n identity matrix is denoted by In or simply I
if n is clear from the context. Similarly, n × m matrices
composed of only ones and only zeros are denoted by 1n×m
and 0n×m, respectively, or simply 1 and 0 when their
dimensions are clear. Finite sequences of vectors are written
as xN := (x(1)⊤, . . . , x(N)⊤)⊤ ∈ RNn with x(i) ∈ Rn,
and n,N ∈ N. We denote powers of matrices as (A)K =
A · · ·A (K times) for K > 0, (A)0 = I , and (A)K = 0 for
K < 0. Matrix Q+ ∈ Rm×n denotes the Moore–Penrose
inverse of Q ∈ Rn×m.
II. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a class of cyber-physical systems whose
physical part can be modeled by switching discrete-time
linear systems of the form:
Σρ :=


xρ(k + 1) = Aρxρ(k) +Bρu(k),
yρ(k) = Cρxρ(k),
ρ ∈ N := {1, 2, . . . , N},
(1a)
y(k) = yρ(k), (1b)
with time index k ∈ N, state xρ ∈ Rnρ , nρ ∈ N, output
y ∈ Rm, m ∈ N, input u ∈ Rl, l ∈ N, and matrices
Aρ ∈ Rnρ×nρ , Bρ ∈ Rnρ×l, and Cρ ∈ Rm×nρ . It is
assumed that, for all ρ ∈ N , Aρ, Cρ, and Bρ are known,
(Aρ, Cρ) is observable, (Aρ, Bρ) is controllable, Im[Cρ] =
R
m, and Ker[Bρ] = {0}. Depending on the operation mode
of the system, output data is generated by one of the N
subsystems in (1), i.e., the output of the system at time
k, y(k) ∈ Rm, is given by y(k) = yρ(k) if the ρ-th
mode (system Σρ) is active, ρ ∈ N . Although y(k) might
switch among different modes, we assume (for trajectory
classification to actually make sense) that during a window of
observations, k ∈ K := {1, 2, . . . ,K}, K ∈ N, the trajectory
Y K = col[y(1), y(2), . . . , y(K)] ∈ RKm is generated by
a single mode, i.e., Y K = col[yρ(1), yρ(2), . . . , yρ(K)],
for some ρ ∈ N , in response to some driving sequence
UK−1 = col[u(1), u(2), . . . , u(K − 1)] ∈ R(K−1)l. With
slight abuse of notation, we often write Y K as Y Kρ to remark
that the trajectory has been generated by subsystem Σρ.
Each operation mode ρ ∈ N characterizes a behaviour
of the system. For instance, in smart devices, we may
have modes indicating our activity level. Depending whether
we are walking, running, or idle, sensors embedded in
the device provide different output trajectories Y Kρ . Each
trajectory would be consistent with the dynamical system
Σρ that produced it. That is, we have a dynamical system
Σρ explaining the data for walking, one for running, and one
for idle. Thus, when we say that an input-output trajectory
(UK−1, Y K) is being classified into a mode ρ ∈ N , we
refer to identifying which system Σρ in (1) produced it. To
classify the mode, we characterize the set of all input-output
trajectories that Σρ could produce, over all possible initial
conditions xρ(1) ∈ Rρ, and then we test if (UK−1, Y K)
belongs to this set – if so, we say that (UK−1, Y K) is
classified into mode ρ. We refer to this set of input-output
trajectories as the behaviour of mode ρ.
Definition 1 (Behaviour) The behaviour Bρ ⊆ RKm of
system Σρ, over k ∈ K = {1, . . . ,K}, is the set of all
input-output trajectories (UK−1, Y K) satisfying (1a) over
all possible initial conditions xρ(1) ∈ Rnρ .
Hence, classification could be accomplished by identifying
to which behaviour Bρ, ρ ∈ N , the trajectory (UK−1, Y K)
belongs. Note, however, that if Bρ∩Bρ′ 6= ∅, for some ρ, ρ′ ∈
N , ρ 6= ρ′, trajectories might belong to multiple behaviours,
i.e., trajectories in the intersection are not classifiable. This
limitation is inherent to the system dynamics and cannot
be surpassed by any classifier. In this manuscript, we are
interested in forcing the cloud to misclassify trajectories. To
induce this, we modify the input-output data that we provide
to the cloud so that it appears to have been generated by a
different mode. Concretely, given (UK−1, Y K) generated by
some mode ρ ∈ N , and a behaviour Bρ′ , ρ′ ∈ N , ρ 6= ρ′, we
seek a map, gρ,ρ′ : Bρ → Bρ′ , referred here as a distorting
map. That is, the map (UK−1, Y K) 7→ gρ,ρ′(UK−1, Y K)
takes trajectories from Bρ and maps them into Bρ′ . By
passing (UK−1, Y K) through gρ,ρ′(·) before transmission,
we are forcing the cloud to classify gρ,ρ′(UK−1, Y K) and
since gρ,ρ′(UK−1, Y K) ∈ Bρ′ , the cloud would (ideally)
classify the mode as ρ′.
Definition 2 (Distorting Map and Target Mode) Given
two behaviours, Bρ and Bρ′ , ρ, ρ
′ ∈ N , ρ 6= ρ′, we say that
a function gρ,ρ′(·) is a distorting map if gρ,ρ′ : Bρ → Bρ′ .
We refer to ρ′ as the target mode.
Note that, because the dynamics of the modes in (1)
is linear, each behaviour Bρ is an linear subspace. The
latter implies that there might exist distorting maps that
make the Euclidian distance between (UK−1, Y K) and
gρ,ρ′(U
K−1, Y K) arbitrarily large. We do not want to overly
distort trajectories. Usually, there is some sensitive informa-
tion (function of the input-output trajectory (UK−1, Y K))
that we would like the cloud to compute accurately. For
instance, in intelligent transportation systems, we might want
the cloud to accurately compute the average speed of vehicles
so that it can send the highway capacity or the shortest
route to a destination back to us. To this end, we introduce
the notions of utility and utility function of the trajectory
(UK−1, Y K).
Definition 3 (Utility and Utility Function) The utility of a
trajectory (UK−1, Y K) refers to some sensitive information,
denoted as z(UK−1, Y K) ∈ Rq, q ∈ N, z : R(K−1)l ×
R
Km → Rq, the cloud must compute accurately. We refer
to the function z(·) as the utility function.
Then, to maintain the utility of the trajectory after distor-
tion, we require that the utility function evaluated at the dis-
torted data equals the utility of the trajectory (UK−1, Y K).
This imposes a constraint on the modes that we can select as
target systems and the class of distorting functions that we
can use. Concretely, we seek distorting mechanisms, gρ,ρ′(·),
that satisfy z ◦ gρ,ρ′(UK−1, Y K) = z(UK−1, Y K) and map
the input-output trajectory (UK−1, Y Kρ ) into the behaviour
Bρ′ – leading to incorrect classification.
In some applications, it might not be realistic to assume
that we know the utility function exactly. If z(·) is completely
unknown, we would not know how to select gρ,ρ′(·) to
avoid overly distorting the trajectory. So, in the problem
formulation introduced above, we are implicitly assuming
that z(·) is known. To relax this, we work with utility
functions that can be written as the composition of two
other functions, an unknown function h : Rr → Rq and
a known function f : R(K−1)l × RKm → Rr, r ∈ N, i.e.,
z(·) = h ◦ f(·). We formulate the problem in terms of the
known part of z(·), the function f(·). This is without loss
of generality as if the complete z(·) is known, z(·) = f(·)
and h(·) = id(·), where id(·) denotes the identity map.
From a different perspective, some utility functions, even
if they are fully known, might be too complicated to work
with. Then, factorising z(·) as h ◦ f(·) and working with
a lower complexity function f(·) might make the problem
more tractable. Then, if z(·) = h ◦ f(·), for some lower (or
equal) complexity known function f(·), the aforementioned
utility constraint, z ◦ gρ,ρ′(UK−1, Y K) = z(UK−1, Y K),
takes the form h◦f ◦gρ,ρ′(UK−1, Y K) = h◦f(UK−1, Y K),
which is satisfied if (and only if when h(·) is an injection)
f ◦ gρ,ρ′(UK−1, Y K) = f(UK−1, Y K).
There are many practical examples where utility functions
can be written as the composition of lower complexity
functions. For instance, consider a room with distributed
temperature sensors, the utility z(Y K) could be a binary
signal that controls whether the air conditioning must be turn
on/off. We do not know how the cloud is actually computing
this control signal; however, we do know it is a function
of the average temperature in the room over a period of
time, f(Y K). Another example is the computation of total
caloric expenditure in fitness smart devices. For each training
session, sensors embedded in the device collect data, send
it to the cloud, and the cloud returns how many calories
we have burned during that training session (this would
be the utility z(Y K)). We do not know exactly how they
compute the caloric expenditure, but we know this com-
putation depends, e.g., on our average velocity (if running)
and maximum/average heart rate during the training session,
f(Y K). Finally, the cost z(Y K) of residential electricity over
a period of time depends on the total power consumption
f(Y K), i.e., z(Y K) = h ◦ f(Y K), for some unknown h(·).
Next, we formally pose the problem we seek to address.
Problem 1 (Misclassification-Utility Problem) Given an
input-output trajectory (UK−1, Y Kρ ), a target mode ρ
′,
ρ, ρ′ ∈ N , ρ 6= ρ′, and a utility function z(·) = h ◦ f(·),
find a distorting map gρ,ρ′ : Bρ → Bρ′ satisfying:
f ◦ gρ,ρ′(UK−1, Y Kρ ) = f(U
K−1, Y Kρ ).
Thus, Problem 1 seeks distorting mechanisms for which
the distorted data leads to the same utility as (UK−1, Y Kρ )
– since f ◦ gρ,ρ′(UK−1, Y Kρ ) = f(U
K−1, Y Kρ ) implies h ◦
f ◦ gρ,ρ′(UK−1, Y Kρ ) = h ◦ f(U
K−1, Y Kρ ) – and that map
the trajectory (UK−1, Y Kρ ) into the behaviour Bρ′ .
Note that, in most of the aforementioned examples of
utility functions (and actually in many more not mentioned
here), the known part of z(·), f(·), is either an average
of some sensor measurements or a weighted sum of them
over a period of time, i.e., f(·) is a linear transformation
of the output trajectory Y K . Motivated by this, we start
our analysis considering affine functions for f(·) that only
depend on output trajectories Y K . Also, because behaviours
are linear subspaces and we consider an affine function f(·),
we start considering affine distorting maps gρ,ρ′(·) too.
III. AFFINE DISTORTING MAPS AND UTILITY
FUNCTIONS
Consider gρ,ρ′(·) and f(·) of the form:
gρ,ρ′(Y, U) :=
(
Y +∆Y
U +∆U
)
, (2a)
f(Y ) := FY + µ, (2b)
with Y,∆Y ∈ RKm, U,∆U ∈ R(K−1)l, ∆ := col[∆Y ,∆U ],
F ∈ Rq×Km, and µ ∈ Rq . It follows that Problem 1 amounts
to finding ∆ ∈ RK(m+l)−l such that col[UK−1+∆U , Y Kρ +
∆Y ] ∈ Bρ′ , ρ, ρ′ ∈ N , ρ 6= ρ′, for some target mode ρ′, and
F (Y Kρ +∆Y ) + µ = FY
K
ρ + µ (i.e., ∆Y ∈ Ker[F ]).
If the complete input-output trajectory (UK−1, Y Kρ ) is
available before transmission, i.e., all data is collected before
it is sent to the cloud, the problem of finding ∆ solving
Problem 1 (for the setting described above) is purely alge-
braic. That is, one might lift the system dynamics for the
length of the trajectory and pose the problem of finding
∆ as the solution of some linear equations. However, in
most real-time applications, input-output data is sent to the
cloud immediately after it is generated. Thus, a more realistic
configuration is to modify (u(k), y(k)) recursively and in
real-time so that the modified data, say (u¯(k), y¯(k)), k ∈ K,
satisfies FY¯ K = FY K (same utility) and (U¯K−1, Y¯ K) ∈
Bρ′ (belongs to the target mode behaviour), for some tar-
get mode ρ′ ∈ N , Y¯ K = col[y¯(1), y¯(2), . . . , y¯(K)], and
U¯K−1 = col[u¯(1), u¯(2), . . . , u¯(K − 1)].
The target mode dynamics, Σρ′ , is characterized by the
triple (Aρ′ , Bρ′ , Cρ′), ρ′ ∈ N , as introduced in (1). By
Definition 1, any input-output trajectory (U¯K−1, Y¯ K) in Bρ′
satisfies the difference equations:{
x¯(k + 1) = Aρ′ x¯(k) +Bρ′ u¯(k),
y¯(k) = Cρ′ x¯(k),
(3)
for some initial condition x¯(1) ∈ Rnρ′ . Therefore, we can
generate trajectories from Bρ′ by fixing the input sequence
u¯(k) ∈ Rl, k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K − 1}, and passing it through
(3) for some initial condition, to obtain an output sequence
y¯(k) ∈ Rm, k ∈ K. By construction, the corresponding
trajectory (U¯K−1, Y¯ K) belongs to Bρ′ . Thus, we can use
(3) to recursively generate trajectories from the target mode
behaviour. The idea is that if we send these trajectories
through the network (instead of the actual (UK−1, Y K)),
the cloud would classify the mode as ρ′. However, we cannot
just send any trajectory. We need Y K and Y¯ K to lead to the
same utility, i.e., FY¯ K = FY K (see (2)). Note that if Y¯ K =
Y K +∆Y , FY¯ K = FY K , if and only if ∆Y ∈ Ker[F ]. Let
∆Y = col[δY (1), . . . , δY (K)], δY (i) ∈ Rm, i ∈ K; then,
Y¯ K = Y K + ∆Y can be written as y¯(k) = y(k) + δY (k),
k ∈ K. Hence, we can address Problem 1 recursively and
in real-time by designing an artificial input sequence u¯(k),
k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K − 1}, and an initial condition x¯(1) ∈ Rnρ′
such that y¯(k) in (3) satisfies y¯(k) = y(k)+ δY (k) for some
∆Y ∈ Ker[F ].
Let u¯(k) = u¯1(k) + u¯2(k), and write the state, x¯(k),
and output, y¯(k), of (3) as x¯(k) = x¯1(k) + x¯2(k) and
y¯(k) = y¯1(k)+ y¯2(k), where (x¯1(k), y¯1(k)) denotes the part
of (x¯(k), y¯(k)) driven by u¯1(k) and (x¯2(k), y¯2(k)) the part
driven by u¯2(k). Using this new notation and superposition
of linear systems, we can write (3) as{
x¯1(k + 1) = Aρ′ x¯
1(k) +Bρ′ u¯
1(k),
y¯1(k) = Cρ′ x¯
1(k),
(4a){
x¯2(k + 1) = Aρ′ x¯
2(k) +Bρ′ u¯
2(k),
y¯2(k) = Cρ′ x¯
2(k),
(4b)
y¯(k) = y¯1(k) + y¯2(k), (4c)
with corresponding initial conditions x¯1(1), x¯2(1) ∈ Rn
satisfying x¯(1) = x¯1(1) + x¯2(1). Then, an approach to
enforce y¯(k) = y(k) + δY (k), k ∈ K, is to design u¯1(k) in
(4a) such that y¯1(k) = Cρ′ x¯1(k) = y(k) (output regulation),
k ∈ K, and u2(k) in (4b) to enforce y¯2(k) = Cρ′ x¯2(k) =
δY (k) (utility invariance), k ∈ K, and apply the combined
u¯(k) = u¯1(k) + u¯2(k) to the virtual target system (3). By
construction, the resulting y¯(k) satisfies y¯(k) = y(k)+δY (k)
and the input-output trajectory (U¯K−1, Y¯ K) belongs to Bρ′ .
Using output-regulation techniques [38]-[39], we design
input u¯1(k) and the initial condition x¯1(1) to regulate the
error, r(k) := y¯1(k) − y(k), given (u(k), y(k)), the true
mode dynamics Σρ, and the target mode ρ′. Input u2(k) is
used to steer y¯2(k), k ∈ K, to an element, ∆Y , in the kernel
of F . Since we know F a priori (before starting the system
operation), we can design u2(k) off-line, i.e., without using
real-time data (u(k), y(k)). In particular, we lift the target
system dynamics (4b) over k ∈ K and cast the problem of
finding x¯2(1) and u¯2(k), k ∈ {1, . . . ,K − 1}, in terms of
the solution of some linear equations.
A. Virtual Output Regulation
Consider the trajectory (UK−1, Y K) generated in real-
time by system Σρ, ρ ∈ N. At every k ∈ K, the input-
output data available to design u¯1(k) is (Uk−1, Y k). For ease
of presentation, we assume that the state xρ(k) of system
Σρ is available for feedback. However, when this is not
true, given observability of (Aρ, Cρ), we can recover the
state xρ(k) from (Uk−1, Y k) after n time-steps (note that,
in general, n ≪ K). In this case, we would have to wait
for n time-steps before we start sending the corrupted data
to the cloud. An alternative would be to use internal model
principle techniques to synthesize dynamic regulators [39]
for u¯1(k). In this manuscript, however, we assume that xρ(k)
is available at every k ∈ K and work with static regulators
to enforce y¯1(k) = y(k), k ∈ K.
Consider the following state controller for system (4a):
u¯1(k) = Rx¯1(k) + Lxρ(k) + Su(k), (5)
with true system state xρ(k) ∈ Rnρ and input u(k) ∈ Rl
of (1), virtual state x¯1(k) ∈ Rnρ′ of (4a), and matrices R ∈
R
l×n
ρ′ , L ∈ Rl×nρ , and S ∈ Rl×l. The feedback term,
Rx¯1(k), is used to enforce internal stability of (4a)-(5) only,
i.e., matrix R is selected so that (Aρ′+Bρ′R) is Schur stable.
Such an R always exists due to controllability of (Aρ′ , Bρ′).
We need internal stability to prevent u¯1(k) from growing
unbounded. The remaining terms in (5), Lxρ(k) and Su(k),
are used to enforce r(k) = y¯1(k)− y(k) = 0, for all u(k) ∈
R
l, xρ(k) ∈ Rnρ , and k ∈ K.
Problem 2 (Virtual Output Regulation) Given input-
output real-time data (u(k), y(k)) generated by mode Σρ,
the target mode dynamics (4a), controller (5), and a matrix
R so that (Aρ′ +Bρ′R) is Schur, find (if possible) matrices
(L, S) in (5) and initial condition x¯1(1) of the virtual
system (4a) such that y¯1(k) = y(k) for all u(k) ∈ Rl,
xρ(k) ∈ Rnρ , and k ∈ K.
Theorem 1 Problem 2 is solvable if and only if there exist
matrices Π ∈ Rnρ′×nρ , Γ ∈ Rl×nρ , and Θ ∈ Rl×l that are
a solution to the regulator equations:

Aρ′Π−ΠAρ +Bρ′Γ = 0,
Cρ′Π− Cρ = 0,
Bρ′Θ−ΠBρ = 0.
(6)
Proof. Sufficiency: Let (6) be satisfied for some (Π,Γ,Θ),
define e(k) := x¯1(k)−Πxρ(k), and consider the closed-loop
dynamics (1),(4a),(5). Then, e(k+1) and the regulation error,
r(k) = y¯1(k)− y(k), can be written as
e(k + 1) = (Aρ′ +Bρ′R)e(k) +
(
Bρ′S −ΠBρ
)
u(k) (7)
+
(
(Aρ′ +Bρ′R)Π−ΠAρ +Bρ′L
)
xρ(k),
r(k) = (Cρ′Π− Cρ)xρ(k) + Cρ′e(k). (8)
Let L = Γ − RΠ, S = Θ, and x¯1(1) = Πxρ(1). Then,
by (6), e(k + 1) = (Aρ′ + Bρ′R)e(k) and r(k) = Cρ′e(k).
Moreover, e(1) = x¯(1) − Πxρ(1) = 0 (because x¯1(1) =
Πxρ(1)). It follows that e(k) = 0 for k ∈ K and hence
r(k) = y¯1(k) − y(k) = 0 for all k ∈ K. Necessity: Let
r(k) = y¯1(k) − y(k) = Cρ′ x¯1(k) − Cρxρ(k) = 0, for all
u(k) ∈ Rl, xρ(k) ∈ Rnρ , and k ∈ K. Consider e(k) =
x¯1(k)−Πxρ(k), for some arbitrary Π ∈ Rnρ′×nρ , and note
that the transformation (xρ(k), x¯1(k)) → (xρ(k), e(k)) is
invertible for any Π. It follows that r(k) can always be
written as in (8) and because r(k) = 0, (Cρ′Π−Cρ)xρ(k)+
Cρ′e(k) = 0. The latter is satisfied for all xρ(k) ∈ Rnρ
(including xρ(k) ∈ Im[Cρ′Π − Cρ]) and u(k) ∈ Rl; hence,
necessarily, Cρ′Π− Cρ = 0 (i.e., the second equality in (6)
is satisfied for some Π), and e(k) ∈ Ker[Cρ′ ]. Consider now
e(k + 1) (given by (7)), and note that e(k + 1) ∈ Ker[Cρ′ ]
for all xρ(k) and u(k) in Rnρ and Rl, respectively, if and
only if e(k) = 0 for all k ∈ K. The latter implies that
(Aρ′ + Bρ′R)Π + Bρ′L = ΠAρ and Bρ′S = ΠBρ, which
equal the first and third equations in (6) with Γ = L + RΠ
and Θ = S. 
Corollary 1 Consider Problem 2 and let Π ∈ Rnρ′×nρ , Γ ∈
R
l×nρ , and Θ ∈ Rl×l solve the regulator equations (6).
Then, L = Γ − RΠ, S = Θ, and x¯1(1) = Πxρ(1) are a
solution to Problem 2.
Proof. Corollary 1 follows from the sufficiency part of the
proof of Theorem 1. 
Theorem 1 provides necessary and sufficient conditions
for Problem 2 to have a solution in terms of the solution of
the regulator equations (6). Once we have a solution (this
solution might not be unique), for given R so that (Aρ′ +
Bρ′R) is Schur, we can compute matrices (L, S) and initial
condition x¯1(1) to realize the controller u¯1(k) in (5) using
Corollary 1.
Remark 1 Note that any controller u¯1(k) in (5) and initial
condition x¯1(1) of (4a) solving Problem 2 provide already
a solution to Problem 1 (for the class of f(·) and gρ,ρ′(·)
introduced above). That is, these u¯1(k) and y¯1(k), k ∈ K,
belong to Bρ′ and, because y¯1(k) = y(k), Y K and Y¯ K =
col[y¯1(1), . . . , y¯1(k)] have the same utility, i.e., FY K =
FY¯ K . However, if we share u¯1(k) and y¯1(k), the cloud
would still get the true output data – with a different input
sequence though. In the next subsection, we provide tools
for properly distorting output data to avoid sharing the true
output sequence with the cloud.
B. Utility Invariance (Batch Approach)
In this subsection, we provide tools for designing u¯2(k)
and x¯2(1) in (4b) so that y¯2(k), k ∈ K, is steered to an
element, ∆Y 6= 0, in the kernel of F . We use the resulting
u¯2(k) and a u¯1(k) synthesized using Corollary 1 to construct
the actual input u¯(k) = u¯1(k) + u¯2(k) and initial condition
x¯(1) = x¯1(1) + x¯2(1) for the virtual system (3). Because
we know F a priori (before starting the system operation)
and u¯1(k) is already being used to handle real-time data,
we can actually design u2(k) off-line, i.e., independent of
(u(k), y(k)). To do so, we lift the target system dynamics
(4b), over k ∈ K, and cast the problem of finding x¯2(1) and
u¯2(k), k ∈ {1, . . . ,K− 1}, in terms of the solution of some
linear equations.
We aim at enforcing that the sequence of virtual outputs
y¯2(k), k ∈ K, is contained in the kernel of F . If Ker[F ]
is trivial, the only vector to which we can drive y¯2(k) is
the zero vector. In this case, u¯1(k) solving Problem 2 and
y¯1(k) = y(k) are the only option for solving Problem 1 (see
Remark 1). Therefore, a necessary condition for Problem 1
to have a different solution (y¯(k) 6= y(k)) is that F has a
nontrivial kernel.
Assumption 1 The kernel of F ∈ Rq×Km is nontrivial.
Consider Y˜ K := col[y¯2(1), . . . , y¯2(K)]. The stacked vec-
tor Y˜ K can be written explicitly in terms of x¯2(1) and
U˜K−1 := col[u¯2(1), . . . , u¯2(K − 1)] as follows

Y˜ K = OK x¯
2(1) + TKU˜
K−1,
TK :=


0 0 · · · 0
Cρ′Bρ′ 0 · · · 0
Cρ′Aρ′Bρ′ Cρ′Bρ′ · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
Cρ′(Aρ′ )
K−2Bρ′ Cρ′(Aρ′ )
K−3Bρ′ · · · Cρ′Bρ′

 ,
OK :=


Cρ′
Cρ′Aρ′
...
Cρ′(Aρ′ )
K−1

 ,
(9)
Problem 3 (Utility Invariance) Given the utility function
(2b) and the target mode dynamics (4b), find (if possible)
an initial condition x¯2(1) ∈ Rnρ′ of (4b) and a sequence
of inputs U˜K−1 = col[u¯2(1), . . . , u¯2(K − 1)] such that
OK x¯
2(1)+TKU˜
K−1 ∈ Ker[F ], with OK and TK as defined
in (9).
Lemma 1 Consider the target mode behaviour Bρ′ . Problem
3 is solvable if and only if Bρ′ ∩ Ker[F ] 6= ∅.
Proof. Note that Bρ′ can be written as Bρ′ = {OKx +
TKU |x ∈ R
n
ρ′ , U ∈ R(K−1)l}. Then, Bρ′ ∩ Ker[F ] 6=
∅ implies that there exists some x∗ and U∗ such that
OKx∗ + TKU∗ ∈ Ker[F ]. Conversely, if for some (x∗, U∗)
OKx∗+TKU∗ ∈ Ker[F ], there is at least one vector in Bρ′ ,
OKx∗ + TKU∗, that is contained in Ker[F ]. 
Theorem 2 Problem 3 is solvable if and only if there exist
vectors x ∈ Rnρ′ , U ∈ R(K−1)l, and θ ∈ RKm solution to
the linear equations:(
OK TK (F
+F − IKm)
)
xU
θ

 = 0. (10)
Proof. Matrix (IKm − F+F ) is a basis of the right kernel
of F . It follows that (IKm − F+F )θ ∈ Ker[F ] for all θ ∈
R
Km. Let (x, U, θ) solve (10). Then,OKx+TKU = (IKm−
F+F )θ ∈ Ker[F ]. Conversely, let (x, U) satisfy OKx +
TKU ∈ Ker[F ]. Then, because (IKm − F+F ) is a basis of
the kernel of F , there most exists θ ∈ RKm so that OKx+
TKU = (IKm − F+F )θ. 
Corollary 2 Consider Problem 3 and let x ∈ Rnρ′ , U ∈
R
(K−1)l, and θ ∈ RKm solve (10). Then, x¯2(1) = x and
U˜K−1 = U are a solution to Problem 3.
Proof. Corollary 2 follows from the proofs of Lemma 1 and
Theorem 2. 
Theorem 2 provides necessary and sufficient conditions for
Problem 3 to have a solution in terms of the solution of (10).
If there exists a solution, using Corollary 1, we can compute
the initial condition x¯2(1) and the sequence of controllers
U˜K−1 = col[u¯2(1), . . . , u¯2(K − 1)] to drive system (4b) so
that Y˜ K ∈ Ker[F ].
Remark 2 For given mode ρ′ ∈ N and utility matrix F ,
there either do not exist solutions to (10) or the solution is
unique or there exist an infinite number of solutions. In the
latter case, the set of solutions form a linear subspace, which
implies that Y˜ K can be chosen arbitrarily large. This is the
most appealing case to us as we can induce arbitrarily large
distortion without affecting the utility of the trajectory.
In the next subsection, we provide a synthesis procedure
to summarize the results presented above.
C. Synthesis Procedure:
Synthesis:
1) Given the mode dynamics Σρ in (1), ρ ∈ N , that will
generate the input-output trajectory, select a target mode Σρ′ ,
ρ′ ∈ N , ρ 6= ρ′.
2) Using the true system matrices (Aρ, Bρ, Cρ) and the target
mode matrices (Aρ′ , Bρ′ , Cρ′), seek a solutionΠ ∈ Rnρ′×nρ ,
Γ ∈ Rl×nρ , and Θ ∈ Rl×l to the regulator equations (6).
3) Select any matrix R so that (Aρ′ + Bρ′R) is Schur, and
compute matrices (L, S) of controller u¯1(k) in (5) and the
initial condition x¯1(1) of (4a) using Corollary 1.
4) Consider the virtual target system (4a), with initial x¯1(1),
and close it with controller u¯1(k) in (5).
5) Given the trajectory length K ∈ N and the utility matrix
F in (2b), compute matrices OK and TK in (9) and seek
a solution x ∈ Rnρ′ , U ∈ R(K−1)l, and θ ∈ RKm to the
linear equations (10).
6) Compute the initial condition x¯2(1) of (4b) and the
sequence of controllers {u¯2(1), . . . , u¯2(K−1)} using Corol-
lary 2.
7) Consider the virtual target system (4b), with initial x¯2(1),
and close it with controller u¯2(k), k ∈ K.
8) Compute the combined input u¯(k) = u¯1(k) + u¯2(k) and
corresponding output y¯(k) = y¯1(k)+ y¯2(k) in (4c), and send
(u¯(k), y¯(k)) to the cloud in real-time.
IV. ACADEMIC EXAMPLE
Consider the following third order continuous-time longi-
tudinal vehicle dynamics:

q˙(t) = v(t),
v˙(t) = a(t),
a˙(t) = −
1
τ
a(t) +
β
τ
u(t),
y(t) = a(t),
(11)
where q ∈ R, v ∈ R, and a ∈ R denote, respectively,
position, velocity, and acceleration of the vehicle, τ ∈ R>0
is the inertia time-lag in the power train, and β ∈ R>0
denotes the engine performance coefficient. We have nominal
engine performance with β = 1, decreased performance with
β < 1, due to, e.g., wear or a poor aerodynamic design, and
increased performance with β > 1, due to spoilers and high
aerodynamic efficiency. This model has been extensively
used in vehicle platooning research, see, e.g., [40]-[42] and
Fig. 1. Traces of y(k) and y¯1(k) (they are indistinguishable).
Fig. 2. Traces of u(k) and u¯1(k).
references therein. We simulate trajectories of an expensive
sports car using (11) with τ = 0.01 and β = 1.50, i.e., small
power train lag (car responds fast to acceleration commands)
and increased engine performance. Acceleration commands,
u(t), and acceleration measurements, y(t), are periodically
sampled and sent to the cloud in real-time. We require the
cloud to compute our average acceleration on the highway,
but we do not wish it to classify our car as a sports car. To
this end, we use the model of a second vehicle of the form
(11), with τ = 0.60 and β = 0.70, and map acceleration
commands/meaurements to its behavior. With this, we want
the cloud to classify our vehicle as having an inefficient
engine (aerodynamic design) and a large power train lag,
i.e., an affordable average car. We exactly discretize both
systems at the sampling time-instants with sampling interval
of 0.1 seconds. The resulting discrete-time systems are of
the form (1a) with (A1, B1, C1) and (A2, B2, C2) given by

(
A1 B1 C
⊤
1
)
=

1 0.1 0.0009000 0.0061499 00 1.0 0.0099995 0.1350010 0
0 0.0 0.0000453 1.4999300 1

 ,
(
A2 B2 C
⊤
2
)
=

1 0.1 0.0047334 0.0001866 00 1.0 0.0921110 0.0055223 0
0 0.0 0.8464820 0.1074630 1

 ,
andN = {1, 2}. The target mode is ρ′ = 2, and the operation
mode of the vehicle is ρ = 1. The driving time is one hour
and because the sampling time is 0.01 seconds, the length
of the trajectory is K = 36000. Next, we use the procedure
in Section III-C to synthesize the distorted trajectory to be
shared with the cloud. We first seek a solution to the matrix
equations in (6). It can be verified that, for the matrices
(Ai, Bi, Ci), i = 1, 2, introduced above, the following Π
and Γ, and Θ = 13.95, are a solution to (6) (the regulator
equations):

 (Π Γ⊤) =

1 −0.038 0.001 0.0000 1.000 −0.038 0.000
0 0.000 1.000 −7.876

 .
We randomly fix the initial condition of system Σ1, x1(1),
select R as R = (−468.99,−130.18,−13.40) (which leads
to eig[A2 + B2R] = {0.1, 0.2, 0.3}), and extract (L, S) of
controller u¯1(k) in (5) and the initial condition x¯1(1) of (4a)
using Corollary 1. We close (4a) with these x¯1(1) and u¯1(k).
From Theorem 1 and Corollary 1, y¯1(k) = y(k) = a(k) for
all k ∈ K, and, by construction, the input-output trajectory,
(u¯1(1), . . . , u¯1(K − 1), y¯1(1), . . . , y¯1(K)), belongs to B2.
In Figure 1, we show traces of y(k) and y¯1(k) (they are
indistinguishable), and in Figure 2 input trajectories, u(k)
and u¯1(k), are depicted. Next, we use Theorem 2 and
Corollary 2 to compute x¯1(1) and u¯2(k). We aim at keeping
the average acceleration of the trajectory invariant. Then, the
utility matrix F and vector µ in (2b) are F = (1/K)11×K
and µ = 0. It can be verified that matrix (OK TK (F+F −
IKm)) in Theorem 2 is full row rank. Then, there exist an
infinite number of solutions to (10), which implies that we
can induce arbitrarily large distortion to trajectories without
affecting their utility (see Remark 2). We randomly choose a
solution to (10), and compute x¯2(1) of (4b) and the sequence
of controllers {u¯2(1), . . . , u¯2(K − 1)} using Corollary 2.
Finally, u¯(k) = u¯1(k)+ u¯2(k) and y¯(k) = y¯1(k)+ y¯2(k) are
computed, and (u¯(k), y¯(k)) is sent to the cloud in real-time
(see Section III-C for details). Both Y K and Y¯ K lead to the
same utility FY K = F Y¯ K = 0.0234. In Figure 3, we show
traces of y(k) and y¯(k), and in Figure 4 input trajectories,
u(k) and u¯(k), are depicted.
V. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a new formulation for dealing with
privacy problems in cyber-physical systems. In particular,
for a class of CPSs, we have addressed the problem of
performing computations over the cloud without revealing
private information about the structure and operation of the
system. A distorting mechanism (based on output regulation
techniques) that ensure CPSs data privacy and utility invari-
ance has been proposed. We have provided simulation results
to test the performance of our tools.
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